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Abstract 
In contemporary Cuba, there is a blatant contradiction between the high prices 
of telecom and wireless services, controlled by a state monopoly, and the weak 
purchasing power of the working class. This contradiction evidences a process of 
commodification that cannot be simply traced back to the partial privatizations 
that the Cuban telecom system experienced after the collapse of the Soviet bloc 
in the 1990s. Commodification is derived from a broader restructuring of the 
state socialist economy that started in the 1990s: the state-led appropriation of 
value in circulation when value is in the money form. In the context of a crisis in 
accumulation, obstacles against changing the conditions in production fostered 
transformations in the domain of circulation to appropriate value in the hands 
of the state. Within these transformations, partial privatizations and the com-
modification of the telecom and wireless services have played a key role for the 
national economy.
Keywords: Political Economy of Communication (PEC), State Socialism, Telecom-
munications, Wireless Communications, Marxism
Resumo
Na Cuba contemporânea, há uma flagrante contradição entre os altos preços dos 
serviços de telecomunicações e sem fio, controlados por um monopólio estadual 
e o fraco poder de compra da classe trabalhadora. Essa contradição evidencia 
um processo de mercantilização que não pode ser simplesmente remontado às 
privatizações parciais que o sistema cubano de telecomunicações experimentou 
após o colapso do bloco soviético na década de 1990. A commodificação é deri-
vada de uma reestruturação mais ampla da economia socialista estadual que co-
meçou na década de 1990: a captura pelo Estado do valor em circulação quando 
este se encontra na forma dinheiro. No contexto de uma crise de acumulação, os 
obstáculos contra a mudança das condições de produção fomentaram as trans-
formações no domínio da circulação para a captura do valor nas mãos do Estado. 
Nessas transformações, a privatização parcial e a mercantilização do serviços de 
telecomunicações e sem fio têm desempenhado um papel fundamental para a 
economia nacional.
Palavras-chave: Economia Política de Comunicação (EPC), Socialismo de Estado, 
Telecomunicações, Marxismo
Resumen
En la Cuba contemporánea existe una notable contradicción entre los altos precios 
de los servicios de telecomunicaciones e inalámbricos, controlados por un monopo-
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lio estatal, y el débil poder adquisitivo de la clase trabajadora. Esta contradicción 
evidencia procesos de mercantilización que no se explican solamente por la privati-
zación parcial que experimentó el sistema de telecomunicaciones cubano después 
del colapso del bloque soviético en los años noventa. La mercantilización se deriva 
de una reestructuración más amplia de la economía socialista de estado que co-
menzó en los años noventa: la extracción de valor en la esfera de la circulación mo-
netaria. En el contexto de una crisis de acumulación, la dificultad de cambiar con-
diciones de producción fomentó transformaciones en el dominio de la circulación 
hacia la captura de valor en manos del Estado. Dentro de estas transformaciones, 
la privatización parcial y la mercantilización de los servicios de telecomunicaciones 
e inalámbricos han jugado un papel clave para la economía nacional.
Palabras clave: Economía Política de la Comunicación (EPC), Socialismo de Estado, 
Telecomunicaciones, Marxismo
Introduction
This project started by questioning why is it that the prices of wireless and Inter-
net services in contemporary Cuba are disproportionately high when compared 
to the median monthly nominal salary of the state-employed population. Hiring 
a cell phone line is almost double the median monthly nominal salary of this sig-
nificant sector, which represents 71 percent of the overall employed population1 
(ETECSA, 2017a; ONEI, 2016, p. 11; 13). In theory, a state employed worker would 
have spent all the monthly pay after an hour and twenty-one minutes of mobile 
calling; and a similar situation would have happened after twenty hours of Inter-
net connection (ETECSA, 2017a, 2017b; ONEI, 2016, p. 11, 13). 
When analyzed through the lenses of a Marxist theoretical framework, this issue 
indicates some contradictions associated with an underlying process of commo-
dification: exchange-values becoming the principal means by which the produc-
tion of use-values is organized; the highly mediated and divergent relationship 
between the value-creation process through human labour and the actual rea-
lization of value through market exchange; and, as an overarching concern, the 
possibility of capital circulation determining this role and functioning of com-
modities and money within the telecom sector, and in the overall state socialist 
regime (MARX, 1990; HARVEY, 2010, 2014; MOSCO, 2009). Even though processes 
of commodification have been frequently analyzed in market capitalism (MARX, 
1990; MOSCO, 2009; HARVEY, 2014), in the Cuban case they acquire particular 
historical forms because of their embeddedness in a state socialist mode of pro-
duction. Revolutionary Cuba, as other historical experiences of state socialism, 
developed a post-market political-economic system for the management of ca-
pital relations based on state ownership of property, command mechanisms for 
surplus-value extraction, and a state-planned strategy for accumulation (GREEN, 
1996; JAMES, 1986). Market capitalism, on the other hand, is broadly defined as 
1  Calculations referring the 
state employed population were 
done using the following official 
statistics (the figures express 
thousands of workers): Active 
population in 2015: 4 979,5. Of 
them, 4 860,5 are employed. Of 
the total of workers employed, 
214,6 are identified as “Co-
operativs” and 1 185,8 as 
“Private sector”. Therefore, it 
can be calculated that the state 
employed population is 3460.1, 
which represents 71.1881 % of 
the total employed. (Oficina 
Nacional de Estadística e 
Información, 2016, p.11). As of 
the median monthly nominal 
salary, and the prices for 
Internet and Wireless services, 
they will be referred later in 
this paper.
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a political-economic system for the management of capital relations based on 
private ownership of property, and the market as the primary mechanism for de-
termining productive goals, prices and wages (GREEN, 1996, p. vi). In this sense, 
my paper aims to explore why wireless communications and Internet access have 
been historically configured within the Cuban socialist project through processes 
of commodification. The analysis will depart from identifying the existence of 
processes of commodification at the moment of the realization of value in this 
sector, as experienced by the state-employed class of wage-labourers. Later on, 
I will explore some of the political and economic processes that have historically 
shaped this situation. Overall, I will argue that the commodification of the te-
lecom and wireless services relates to a structural reconfiguration of the state 
socialist economy after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. As a result, the telecom 
and wireless system became a key sector for primitive accumulation and value 
appropriation from the sphere of circulation when value is in the money form. 
Theoretical start point: from commodification to the price-form
The price-form is one of the clearest indicators of a structural process of commo-
dification. Commodification, or the proliferation of the commodity-form, occurs 
when exchange-values become the principal means through which the produc-
tion and/or social provision of use-values is organized (HARVEY, 2014; MOSCO, 
2009). This definition is derived from Marx’s argument in Capital, which identifies 
the dual character of the commodity as springing out of an economic process of 
exchange: it is set for exchange by a seller (therefore, it has an exchange-value), 
while it also has a use-value that makes it wanted, needed or desired by a buyer 
(MARX, 1990, p. 179; HARVEY, 2010). A use-value can be broadly defined as “the 
usefulness of a thing” (MARX, 1990, p. 126), and constitutes the qualitative and 
heterogeneous character of commodities (HARVEY, 2010). On the other hand, as 
exchange-values in the marketplace, commodities are quantified and homoge-
nized towards ensuring its commensurability in the process of exchange (MARX, 
1990, pp. 126-127; HARVEY, 2010). The commodity itself is subjected to contradic-
tory determinations, since “all commodities are non-use-values for their owners 
and use-values for their non-owners” (MARX, 1990, p. 179). 
In Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production and its concrete forms of 
market exchange, the commensurability of commodities relies on that they are 
“the residues of the products of labour… as crystals of this social substance, whi-
ch is common to them all, they are values – commodity values” (MARX 1990, p. 
128). Therefore, value is a socially constructed category that makes all commodi-
ties commensurable in the process of exchange (HARVEY, 2010). Exchange-values 
are the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value (MARX, 
1990, p. 128). Also, historically specific to capitalism is the configuration of the 
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magnitude of the value of an article as “the amount of labour socially necessary, 
or the labour-time socially necessary for its production” (MARX, 1990, p. 129).
With the proliferation and generalization of exchange relations, a universal 
equivalent emerged and took the form of a tangible money-commodity that ac-
ted as a measure of value and as means of circulation of commodities (MARX, 
1990, p. 188). Both functions entail several contradictions. While the origin of the 
money-form is that of the universal equivalent for exchange, the proliferation 
of exchange relations also creates the need for money in order to advance the 
production of commodities for the market (MARX, 1990, pp. 227-234; HARVEY, 
2010). This contradiction is solved as money becomes the means of payment (in 
the form of money of account, credit money) (MARX, 1990, p. 233). Therefore, 
apart from buyers and sellers, a new social relation arises: that of creditors and 
debtors. However, from the debtor-creditor relation also emerges the need of 
money not only as the medium, the lubricant, of the circulation process, but its 
very end. When the debtor-creditor relations are configured, “the indebtor only 
sells commodities in order to be able to pay. The value-form of the commodity, 
money, has become the self-sufficient purpose of the sale, owing to a social ne-
cessity springing from the conditions of the process of circulation itself” (MARX, 
1990, p. 233). Therefore, the basic principle for the existence of a social relation 
in which money is advanced in order to obtain more money, crystallizes out of the 
circulation of commodities (MARX, 1990, p. 233; HARVEY, 2010). The circulation 
of commodities and money set the ground for the emergence of capital as a pro-
cess and a social relation in which value is set in motion with the express purpose 
of its valorization (MARX, 1990, 1992; HARVEY, 2010, 2013). 
Overall, commodification means that the social production must adhere to the 
value-form, “a universal form of the bourgeois mode of production” (MARX, 
1990, p. 174). Through this forms, human labour ends up being expressed in va-
lue and measured by its duration (socially necessary labour-time). However, such 
measurement is only expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product 
–formulas that, as Marx puts it, “bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a 
social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, inste-
ad of the opposite” (1990, p. 173).
At the same time, commodification, as the production for exchange rather than 
use-values, (re)produces the need for the existence of a universal equivalent 
whose contradictions, along with those of the commodity, can account for the 
crystallization of capital as a social relation. Also, the contradiction between the 
social power of money and the possibility of its private appropriation (MARX, 
1990, pp. 229-230) creates a terrain for the emergence of social inequalities.
It is with the aid of money that commodities can be labeled in the market with 
an asking price (HARVEY, 2014, p. 31). A price is defined by Marx as the money-
-name of the labour objectified in a commodity (MARX, 1990, p. 195). It reflects 
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the highly mediated and divergent relationship between the value-creation pro-
cess through human labour, and the actual realization of value through market 
exchange. Prices can diverge between the magnitude of value depending on spe-
cific conditions of supply and demand in specific times and places. Also, a price 
can be attached to things that have no value at all (that are not the product of 
human labour for exchange), but the mere attachment of a price commodifies 
them (MARX, 1990, pp. 196-197). Overall, its existence implies an exchange rela-
tion based in the commodity and money forms. 
Assessing the commodification of the Cuban telecom and wireless services
In revolutionary Cuba, egalitarian distribution (or what Green identifies as a form 
of social provision based on use-values) has remained a goal in certain state-ow-
ned sectors such as health and education, which are provided for free to the po-
pulation (PEREZ, 2012; GREEN, 1996; CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996). 
However, in the case of wireless communications and Internet access, there is an 
incongruity between their high prices, controlled by a state monopoly, and the 
weak purchasing power of the working class. According to official statistics, the 
median monthly nominal salary in Cuba for the year 2015 was 687 Cuban pesos 
(CUP) (ONEI, 2016, p. 13). The only company which provides telecommunications 
and wireless services in Cuba, the currently state-owned ETECSA, has established 
its prices in another currency that also circulates within the country as the inter-
nal equivalent to the dollar, the Cuban convertible (CUC) (MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-
-LOPEZ, 2013; VIDAL, 2012; ETECSA, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). Following an exchange 
rate of 24 CUP to one CUC, the median monthly nominal salary equals 28.6 CUC 
(ONEI, 2016, p.13; VIDAL, 2012). Since hiring a line for mobile communications 
costs 40 CUC, this is almost one and a half the median monthly nominal salary 
(ETECSA, 2017c). Moreover, the cost for a one-minute phone call between 7 a.m. 
and 10:59 p.m. is 0.35 CUC, thus 28.6 CUC would buy 81.7 minutes for mobile 
calling (ETECSA, 2017a). As to the Internet, an hour of access costs 1.50 CUC, the-
refore the whole median monthly nominal salary equals around twenty hours of 
Internet connectivity (ETECSA, 2017b).
The above analysis attempts to illustrate how processes of commodification are 
evidenced at the moment of realization of value in the marketplace, where mo-
netary gains and exchange-values are determining the social uses of these servi-
ces in Cuba. Meanwhile, an expected consequence of this process of commodi-
fication is that the provision of these services at high prices when compared to 
the wages could be diminishing the discretionary income available to labour in 
Cuban society, and thus recapturing value away from the working class (HARVEY, 
2014). Overall, this contradicts the initial transformations that the telecom system 
experienced with the triumph of the Revolution in 1959. Affordable and widely 
distributed telephone services were considered among the achievements of the 
working class, at least during the first three decades of state socialism in Cuba 
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(NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; RECIO, 2014). In pre-revolutionary Cuba, U.S. capitalist 
investors controlled more than one-third of the country’s public utilities, domina-
ting domestic and international telecommunications and controlling 90 percent 
of electrical generating capacity (PERICAS, 2014; NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; HOFF-
MANN, 2004). In this context, telephone services exhibited prices only affordable 
to certain wealthy sectors of the Cuban society (RECIO, 2014; PERICAS, 2014). Its 
territorial distribution was highly uneven: in 1958, 73 percent of installed tele-
phone service was in the capital, Havana, where about 20 percent of the popu-
lation resided (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). With the triumph of the revolutionary 
forces lead by Fidel Castro in January 1959, the telephone sector was among the 
first ones fully nationalized by the emerging state socialist project. Revolutionary 
interventions (also called “temporary” takeovers) in the Cuban Telephone Com-
pany started as early as March 3rd 1959, with its full nationalization announced 
by Fidel Castro to a cheering crowd on August 6th 1960. At the time, the Cuban 
Telephone Company assets, worth US$132.9 million which pertained to the U.S.-
-based International Telephone and Telegraph company (ITT), were nationalized, 
as well as US$267.6 million from Cuban Electric (a subsidiary of Boise-Cascade) 
(PERICAS, 2014; NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). Then, prices for fixed-lines became 
affordable for the majority of the population (RECIO, 2014; NICHOLS, TORRES, 
1998; HOFFMANN, 2004). Also, its territorial distribution was broadened, largely 
in consideration of its social uses than its commercial values. By 1982, only 56 
percent of new services were being installed in the capital; the rest was in the 
provinces. Furthermore, the number of telephones nationwide nearly doubled 
(NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; HOFFMANN, 2004).
However, with the crisis and economic restructuring that followed the collapse 
of the Soviet bloc in the 1990s, the introduction of wireless and Internet commu-
nications in revolutionary Cuba occurred on the basis of their commodification, 
as the relationship between prices and median monthly nominal salary presen-
ted above demonstrate. In other words, a social and economic logic closer to 
market capitalism has been implemented within this sector of the state socialist 
regime. This means that a state monopolized market, and not state-planning, is 
the primary mechanism for determining productive goals and prices. As a result, 
the telecommunications sector does not seem to be ensuring a satisfactory social 
wage for the working class in Cuba today, as it did before. Changes within the 
state socialist project after 1990 have configured this sector as a step-back in the 
privileges once won by the workers. In other words, what labour might have 
won in the domain of production under the state socialist regime, is taken back 
by means of commercial and renting mechanisms in the sphere of telecommuni-
cations that prioritize exchange over use-values2. To some extent, this could be 
related to what HARVEY (2014) calls accumulation by dispossession as primary 
means for the extraction of income and wealth from the working classes. Accor-
ding to HARVEY, the stealing back of privileges once acquired by this class, such 
as services that underpin a satisfactory social wage (telecommunications among 
them), is a blatant form of dispossession under neoliberalism as another way of 
2  Following MARX’s analysis 
for the sphere of capital 
circulation, I consider that 
the commodification of the 
telecommunications sector 
can be broadly seen as a 
commercial mechanism for the 
appropriation of value from the 
sphere of circulation (MARX, 
1992). However, it is possible 
to conceive the provision of 
Internet access as both a form 
of rent and a commercial 
endeavour. However, this fine 
and important theoretical 
distinction will not be addressed 
in this paper.
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ensuring capital accumulation (HARVEY, 2014, pp. 67-68). However, Cuba is not 
an openly committed neoliberal social formation today. The socialist legacies and 
promises of the Cuban state must be taken seriously in its material and symbolic 
effectivity, and it would be a mistake to simply equate the Cuban state with ne-
oliberal markets in authoritarian states elsewhere in the world (see ZHAO 2008, 
for a similar discussion on the Chinese case). Why are these services provided for 
exchange then, within the state socialist project?
Cuban telecommunications and the crisis of state socialism
At first, it seems that commodification of wireless communications and Internet 
access in Cuba can be explained by the partial privatization that the national te-
lecommunications system experienced in the early 1990s. Since the major state-
-owned telecommunications enterprise sought a foreign private capitalist partner, 
commodification was an expected consequence: capital, as value in motion with 
the purpose of expanding itself, initiates and finishes each cycle of transformations 
in the money-form, but needs to adopt the commodity-form to realize in the ma-
rketplace the surplus-value produced through the consumption of labour power 
and means of production in the productive stage (MARX, 1990, 1992). Even though 
this is a reasonable explanation from the viewpoint of private capital investors, the 
state socialist’s story is coherent but more complex than this one. 
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc between 1989 and 1991, Cuba underwent an 
economic crisis that determined the reconfiguration of its telecommunications 
system (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). The disappearance of socialism in the Soviet 
Union and in Eastern Europe, as well as of the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (Comecon), resulted in the immediate loss of price subsidies and soft 
loans for Cuba that had amounted to US$65 billion from the Soviet Union alone 
between 1960 and 1990 (MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-LOPEZ, 2013). This also resulted in 
the cessation of hundreds of Soviet investment projects, and the virtual end to all 
trade and economic aid from Eastern Europe (MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-LOPEZ, 2013). 
At the time of the collapse, trade accounted for approximately half of the island’s 
gross national product, and Soviet allied countries for 85 percent of that trade 
(ECKSTEIN, 2007). Under the circumstances, Cuba’s GDP shrunk 34.8 percent in 
the four years following 1990 (VIDAL, 2012; ECKSTEIN, 2007). During the period 
of crisis, the government sought to promote economic growth by reorienting in-
vestments to the most strategic sectors, while looking for new sources of money 
capital to finance imports and investments, as well as to service a foreign debt da-
ting back to the Soviet era (CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996; ECKSTEIN, 
2007). By the end of 1994, 185 foreign firms had signed joint-venture agreements 
with state-owned Cuban companies, and some 30 more agreements were signed 
during the first 8 months of 1995 (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). 
Springing from this overarching context, it can be considered that partial pri-
vatizations of the telecom sector also took place as means for acquiring money 
capital. Between 1994 and 1995, the existing telecommunications system transi-
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ted from a state monopoly to a mixed public-private ownership (Hoffman, 2004; 
NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; RECIO, 2014). The national Cuban Telecommunications 
Enterprise (EMTELCUBA) was partially privatized through a US$1.1 billion joint-
-venture agreement with a Mexican holding company, Grupo Domos. This com-
pany acquired a 49 percent interest in EMTELCUBA and was given a 55-year mo-
nopoly concession on Cuban domestic and long distance services. Domos paid 
Cuba US$700 million and pledged a US$400 million infusion for EMTELCUBA. 
The Cuban government also put US$400 million into EMTELCUBA, thus the now 
partially privatized enterprise had US$800 million to renovate the telecom sys-
tem. Overall, Cuba netted US$300 million, consisting of US$100 million cash and 
US$200 in Cuban debt to Mexico (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; HOFFMANN, 2004).
Although foreign investment had been flowing into Cuba for several years, selling 
a partial stake in EMTELCUBA was the first privatization of a state enterprise sin-
ce the revolutionary triumph in 1959, and was the largest foreign investment of 
any type until then (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). The agreement was announced 
in Havana by Fidel Castro himself, and then-Mexican President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). This was a significant twist in the economic 
and social policies for this sector within the state socialist project, since the te-
lecommunications system had been among the first ones fully nationalized and 
transformed by the Revolution (PERICAS, 2014; NICHOLS, TORRES 1998; RECIO, 
2014). However, the shift towards privatization was presented by the Cuban au-
thorities as the solution to the precarious infrastructure of the sector, and to the 
state’s inability to finance the system’s much needed repairs and modernizations 
(RECIO, 2014; NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998). By mid-1995, an estimated 30 percent of 
the country’s access lines were inoperable, and less than 18 percent of domestic 
calls were actually completed (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998).
However, when looking at the broader state socialist project, such difficulty to 
operate the telecommunications system under state financing can be seen as the 
result of the centralized planning and administration of the economy. In the mi-
dst of the economic crisis, some state-financed areas were prioritized over others 
in order to sustain the use-value goals that had characterized the Revolution in 
terms of the provision of health, education and employment. Even though the 
state budget was reduced significantly with a GDP contraction of 34.8 percent, 
nominal spending on health and education was not reduced (VIDAL, 2012). Also, 
while the revenues of virtually all enterprises fell dramatically, state subsidies to 
those experiencing losses were increased in order to avoid massive unemploy-
ment (VIDAL, 2012). In this context, the telecommunications system was not prio-
ritized for state-financing. On the contrary, along with tourism (ECKSTEIN, 2007), 
it was among the spheres significantly privatized and commodified in order to 
gather money capital to fuel its own growth and other state-run sectors3. And 
the same situation happened with wireless communications, introduced in Cuba 
in this period, which started in the form of a mixed public-private venture. -In 
3 The Cuban scholar Milena 
RECIO Silva (2014) considers 
that, even though there is 
no public data available on 
what ETECSA does with its 
revenue, it can be assumed 
that the company pays to 
the Cuban state a significant 
amount for the monopolistic 
concession on operating all 
the telecommunications and 
wireless connections in the 
island.
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1992, Telecomunicaciones de Mexico SA (TIMSA) paid US$8 million for a 50 per-
cent stake in the newly born Cellular Telephone Company of Cuba (CUBACEL) 
(NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; RECIO, 2014).
The telecom joint-venture was formed as a Sociedad Anonima (stock company) 
named ETECSA, a new Spanish acronym for Cuban Telecommunications Enter-
prise S.A. Through the Decree 190 of the Executive Committee of the Council 
of Ministers signed in August 17th 1994, ETECSA was granted an administrative 
concession on all national and international telephone services, signals conduc-
tion, data transmission, telex and mobile communications. At present, ETECSA is 
still Cuba’s full telecommunications service provider. The 1994’s concession was 
renewed by Decree 275 of 2003 for 15 years, until 2018 (RECIO, 2014). In April 
1995, Domos sold 25 percent of the ETECSA shares for US$291.3 million to the 
Società Finanziaria Telefonica, a subsidiary of the Italian state-owned company 
STET (also known as Telecom Italia) (NICHOLS, TORRES, 1998; HOFFMANN, 2004). 
In the following months, Domos sold all of its remaining shares. By February 
1997, STET owned 29.29 percent of ETECSA shares, the Cuban Communications 
Ministry 51 percent, and the rest was the hands of a consortium of Cuban para-
-statal financial entities (HOFFMANN, 2004; RECIO, 2014).
While the entrance of foreign private capital in the telecom sector could have in-
fluenced its further commodification, such explanation alone is weakened by the 
fact that the system became fully state-owned again in 2011. At the time, a state 
financial company, Rafin, bought the remaining 29.29 actions owned by Telecom 
Italia (RECIO, 2014; NICHOLS, TORRES 1998). Nevertheless, prices established by 
ETECSA for mobile and Internet services in contemporary Cuba (2016-2017) eviden-
ce processes of commodification, as argued previously in this paper. The fact that 
commodification has remained under state control reinforces the view that the 
generalization of the commodity-form in wireless and Internet communications 
cannot be plainly explained by the entrance of foreign private capital in the sector. 
It should be understood as part of a structural reconfiguration that has somehow 
contributed to the survival of the state socialist mode of production. This assump-
tion is strengthened by another state-led strategy deployed to acquire money capi-
tal for the economy after 1990: the appropriation of value from the sphere of mo-
ney circulation. This strategy emerged when the sphere of circulation started to be 
significantly infused by hard-currency entering the Cuban economy in the form of 
remittances, i.e. people-to-people cross-border income transfers (ECKSTEIN, 2007).
Commodification as a strategy for capturing hard-currency from 
the sphere of circulation
Remittances sent to Cubans from family or friends living overseas surged in early 
1990 to the point of infusing more hard-currency into the island economy than any 
single island export. Remittances approximately doubled the amount foreign bu-
215  
     215
sinesses invested in 2000, and multiplied by twenty the investments of 2001 (ECKS-
TEIN, 2007). Since the emergence of this phenomenon, the government introduced 
a number of measures that enabled the state to appropriate the hard-currency 
at remittance senders’ and recipients’ expense (MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-LOPEZ, 2013; 
ECKSTEIN, 2007). State-run foreign-currency stores (TRD) were created with the 
purpose of selling goods to the population able to pay in hard currencies. At the 
same time, goods sold in state-run stores progressively diminished in quantity and 
quality (VIDAL, 2012; MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-LOPEZ, 2013). Cuban authorities justified 
an ideal mark-up of 240 per cent above cost at these hard-currency stores on equi-
ty grounds. This was a way of applying a hidden tax on consumers purportedly to 
fund programs for dollarless Cubans. However, authorities instituted no guarantee 
that profits would be channelled to such distributive justice, and there is no eviden-
ce that the profits were so earmarked (ECKSTEIN, 2007).
Since cellular telephones and services, as well as Internet access, became available 
to Cuban citizens in 2008 and 2012 respectively, they have been sold as any other 
TRD commodity - in commercial offices of ETECSA or in traditional TRD stores 
(MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-LOPEZ 2013; ETECSA, 2016a, 2016b). Their exchange-values 
are expressed in Cuban convertible pesos (CUC), the internal equivalent to the 
dollar (MESA-LAGO, PEREZ-LOPEZ 2013; RECIO, 2014). Therefore, the broader 
strategy of the government to extract hard-currency from the remittances seems 
to be also configuring the telecom sector. Wireless and Internet communications 
have become another significant state-managed domain in which hard-currency 
is captured from the sphere of circulation as it is significantly infused by remit-
tances. Probably the highest indicator of this character is the international pay-
ments services, or ‘top-up from abroad’ (recarga desde el exterior), that ETECSA 
has strongly promoted in the last years (ETECSA, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d). From its 
very name it can be noticed that this service is conceived as a form of remittances 
in kind. Through this service, payments of Internet accounts, cellular lines, and 
international fixed-lines administered by ETECSA can be done via hard-currency 
transactions either online or at stores in six foreign countries (ETECSA 2016d; RE-
CIO, 2012). Furthermore, while national fixed-lines still exhibit affordable prices 
for the sate-employed population, fixed-lines for international communications 
are also commodified and paid for in CUC (ETECSA, 2016c).
In summary, the restructuring of Cuban state socialism after the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc did not just influence the telecommunications sector in terms of its 
partial privatization through joint-venture agreements with foreign capitalist par-
tners. The goal of acquiring money capital to overcome the economic crisis also 
fostered the commodification of wireless communications and Internet access as 
one way of appropriating value from the instance of money circulation, since this 
sphere was (and still is) significantly infused with hard-currency from the remit-
tances. As a result, orientation towards monetary gains has made egalitarian dis-
tribution (use-value) conditional upon exchange-values in Cuba’s telecom sector.
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The underlying situation: Cuba’s transformations in a neoliberal era
The commodification of the Cuban telecom and wireless system can be also un-
derstood as part of a wider restructuring of the state socialist regime around 
merchant and renting forms of value appropriation4 in the hands of the state that 
started after the collapse of the Soviet camp. Since 1990, the large decrease in 
the state socialist production initiated a process of decapitalization in the Cuban 
economy as a result of the forced paralysis of substantial parts of the national 
industry (CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996). To solve this crisis in accumu-
lation, the government attempted to change some conditions in production. As 
mentioned before, national investments were reoriented to the most strategic 
sectors, while new sources of money capital tried to be attracted5 (CARRANZA, 
GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996; ECKSTEIN, 2007). Nevertheless, the transformations 
of Cuban state socialism in this regard did not lead to its complete integration 
into the capitalist world market –at least not through ‘traditional’ articulations 
based on significant access to credit lines and foreign investments. In a post-Cold 
War move to suffocate the socialist regime, the U.S. government strengthened 
its economic blockade against the island. Established since early 1960s, the blo-
ckade limits Cuba’s ability to engage in trade and financial activities in the world 
market (CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996; ECKSTEIN, 2007). Moreover, 
because Cuba had stopped paying its Western debt in 1986, Western banks cut 
Cuba off from new credit lines, so the country only accessed short-term, high 
interest-bearing hard currency loans, and credit mainly to finance imports (ECKS-
TEIN, 2007). Meanwhile, the Cuban government guided the ‘openness’ to foreign 
investments so it still accounted for significant levels of state control, considering 
that the growth in this sector beyond certain limits could become a major obsta-
cle to the control of the country’s basic resources and a threat to the social achie-
vements of the Revolution (CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996). 
While obstacles against solving the crisis by changing some conditions in produc-
tion were manifesting, the government advanced several transformations in the 
sphere of circulation. These were mostly directed to capture value for the state-
-led economy (when value is in the money form). Hard currency was entering 
the country in the form of remittances through formal or informal channels, and 
also in the hands of a growing number of foreign tourists6. As mentioned in a 
previous section of this paper, an opportunity for increasing the state’s foreign 
exchange availability was found in the creation of hard-currency stores (TRD) 
and currency exchange agencies (CADECA) all over the island (ECKSTEIN 2007; 
CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996). Financial mechanisms became stron-
gly relevant in the context of the dollarization (1993) and de-dollarization of the 
economy (2003-2004), the establishment of the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) as 
the internal equivalent to the dollar, and the application of a 10 percent tax for 
every U.S. dollar exchanged (PEARSON, 1996; VIDAL, 2012; ECKSTEIN, 2007). Ove-
rall, within the still highly centralized and state-planned economy, these forms 
of commercial and financial mechanisms started functioning as means of appro-
4 The capitalist mode of 
production is based on a 
specific set of social relations 
of production in which value, 
as socially necessary labour-
time, and surplus-value, or 
unpaid labour-time, should be 
produced in an ever-expanding 
scale, implying the need for 
accumulation and growth. 
MARX analytically divides the 
process of capital in production 
and circulation (volume I 
and volumes II of Capital, 
respectively). Capital circulation 
refers to the moments in which 
money, commodities and even 
labour-power, as the functional 
forms assumed by capital, are 
being transformed as part of 
the valorization process that 
constitutes capital. However, 
surplus-value, or unpaid labour-
time, which is the basis of the 
expansion of capital, is not 
created in the transformations 
that occur during circulation 
(MARX, 1990, 1992; HARVEY, 
2010, 2013). Furthermore, in 
the circulation of capital, other 
economic activities become 
integrated into the circuits of 
capital to appropriate part 
of the circulating surplus-
values, such as merchant 
(commercial and financial) and 
rent capitalists. MARX is very 
emphatic in that these economic 
activities do not create surplus-
value; they only appropriate 
from the circulating surplus-
value (MARX, 1990, 1992; 
HARVEY, 2010, 2013).
5  Changes in the socialist 
legislation accompanied the 
process of attracting new 
sources of money capital. A 
Constitutional Reform in July 
1992 redefined the rule of 
socialist ownership and confined 
it to the fundamental means 
of production. In 1995, a more 
flexible foreign investment 
law was enacted, allowing 
for 100 percent of foreing 
participation and extending the 
arena for foreign investment 
to all sectors of the economy 
except public health, education 
and areas connected with 
national defence. However, 
the government held the right 
of case-by-case approval of 
every endeavor (CARRANZA, 
GUTIERREZ, MONREAL, 1996; 
ECKSTEIN 2007; MESA-LAGO, 
PEREZ-LOPEZ, 2013).
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priation of value from the sphere of money circulation7. It is interesting to note 
how the particular and contradictory insertion of the Cuban economy into the 
world market after the 1990s followed some patterns of the crisis in accumu-
lation that fostered other forms of capitalist reproduction after 1970s, such as 
financial capitalism (MC NALLY, 2011; HARVEY, 2014)8. While somehow reflecting 
an adaptation to neoliberalism and to the transformations occurring in capital 
circulation after the 1970s, the uniqueness of the Cuban case lies on its weak 
integration into global financial capital (ECKSTEIN, 2007), while still deploying 
its own forms of financial and merchant mechanisms at the domestic level. To a 
great extent, this adds to the debates on actually-existing socialism and its adop-
tion of the forms of value production and circulation of the capitalist mode of 
production (JAMES, 1989; GREEN, 1996). Because of Cuba’s need for engaging in 
global market exchange to satisfy social needs, it has not be exempted from what 
Harvey calls “the disciplinary effects that flow from commodity exchange across 
the world market” (2010, 81). It has been argued that historical experiences of 
state socialism did not transform the essential feature of capital, meaning the 
class relation between capital and labour in production to facilitate the systemic 
extraction of surplus-value, or unpaid labour time, to generate accumulation (JA-
MES, 1989; GREEN, 1996). Nevertheless, it is still an essential difference that state 
socialist systems transformed property relations by disinheriting the traditional 
capitalist class structured around private property rights (GREEN, 1996; JAMES, 
1989). The application of state ownership to the means of production avoids 
private accumulation and facilitates the achievement of more egalitarian forms 
of distribution via the state after the completion of each cycle of accumulation. 
Conclusive notes
The restructuring of actually-existing socialism in Cuba after the collapse of the So-
viet bloc was not guided by the pursuit of a traditional insertion into the capitalist 
world economy based on external credits and direct foreign investments. However, 
several instances within the state socialist regime were created and/or transfor-
med so as to appropriate value from the sphere of circulation. Within the wider 
restructuring, the telecom and wireless system became a key sector to reinvigorate 
the national economy. Partial privatizations functioned as a form of primitive accu-
mulation, granting money capital for this and other sectors of the state-managed 
realm. Meanwhile, until today, its commodification acts as a means for capturing 
value from the sphere of money circulation. While this is the often unnoticed deep 
structure behind the commodification of the state-run telecom sector in contem-
porary Cuba, this paper started by uncovering its most visible consequence: that 
the exchange-values of wireless communications and Internet access make of this a 
mechanism through which the income available to labour is diminished, and value 
is recaptured away from the population in Cuban society.
6  As a reinvigorated economic 
activity, tourism was the 
state-managed sector that 
maintained the most stable 
growth levels from 1990 to 
1995, although with the highest 
degrees of involvement of 
foreign capital. Up to October 
1994, 16,4 percent of all existing 
agreements with foreign 
partners were located in this 
area (CARRANZA, GUTIERREZ, 
MONREAL, 1996).
7  This shows that the 
appropriation of value in the 
sphere of money circulation 
usually results more convenient 
in order to transform it 
into money capital. If value 
is appropriated when it is 
congealed in the commodity-
form, then it is necessary to 
engage in market exchange to 
transform it into money capital.
8  To a great extent, this adds to 
the debates on actually-existing 
socialism and its adoption of 
the forms of value production 
and circulation of the capitalist 
mode of production (JAMES, 
1989; GREEN, 1996). Because 
of Cuba’s need for engaging 
in global market exchange to 
satisfy social needs, it has not 
be exempted from what Harvey 
calls “the disciplinary effects 
that flow from commodity 
exchange across the world 
market” (2010, 81). It has 
been argued that historical 
experiences of state socialism 
did not transform the essential 
feature of capital, meaning the 
class relation between capital 
and labour in production to 
facilitate the systemic extraction 
of surplus-value, or unpaid 
labour time, to generate 
accumulation (JAMES, 1989; 
GREEN, 1996). These regimes 
transformed property relations, 
disinheriting the traditional 
capitalist class, and fusing 
capital with the state (JAMES, 
1989; GREEN, 1996). Therefore, 
through the generalization 
of state ownership over the 
means of production, more 
egalitarian forms of distribution 
were attempted after the 
completion of each cycle of 
accumulation. Under capital’s 
scheme for accumulation, 
labour, commodities and money 
are articulated so as to support 
a valorization process based 
on the subsumption of labour 
power in production (HARVEY, 
2010, 2013).
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